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Brazil, Latin America’s largest and most populous country, ranks 
among the world’s premier emerging market countries. Over the past 
two decades the country’s international profile has risen steadily and 
it now forms part of the BRIC grouping of nations. Brazil can be seen 
as a key player in an increasingly multi polar world. Its rise to global 
prominence followed victory over hyperinflation and a partially 
successful attack on poverty and inequality. Yet Brazil’s enhanced 
international standing is now threatened by a deep economic recession 
and a political crisis that has already claimed one president. 
This lecture considers these events in longer term perspective. More 
specifically, it highlights the recurrent structural constraints which have 
afflicted Brazil’s development process over the decades. These centre 
on issues such as the dualistic and partial nature of modernization; 
overreliance on commodities exports; inconsistency in economic 
policy regimes, and clientalistic relationships between the state and big 
business. Can these issues be addressed? Can Brazil emerge from crisis 
and resume its upward trajectory? There are grounds for optimism on 
these scores. 
In first place ss a result of successful past policy interventions, genuine 
economic achievements have been realized. New competitive strengths 
and capabilities have been developed. At the same time, real progress 
has been made in tackling ingrained poverty and inequality. These 
accomplishments provide a good base on which to build and further 
the course of inclusive development. 
Moreover, the current crisis has demonstrated astonishing institutional 
resilience in the face of severe challenge to the post 1985 democratic 
settlement. Prosecutors have fearlessly taken on powerful vested 
interests. The public has proven no longer willing to accept pervasive 
corruption in government or in business. This may presage the shift in 
social and political consciousness necessary to underpin vital reforms. 
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Introduction
Honoured Rector, Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, it 
is truly a pleasure to stand before you today, on the occasion 
of my Oratie as Professor of Brazilian Studies here at Leiden 
University. I do so at a time of considerable challenge and 
uncertainty in Brazil. My remarks will reflect that reality 
as well as the opportunities that continue to flow from a 
country that, as ever, is so replete in promise. Over the next 
45 minutes I will offer my personal view of Brazil’s progress 
and achievements, its discontents, frustrations and enduring 
potential. I will give an assessment of the structural issues 
which will need to be addressed if Brazil is to embark on a 
sustained path of inclusive growth. However, I will begin by 
attempting to conjure up in the minds of you, the audience, a 
sense of the scope, promise and even magic of Brazil. For it is 
these that hold out hope for the future and continue to explain 
why so many of us are drawn to study the country in the first 
place.
Brazil in the mind of the foreigner can resemble a mysterious, 
exotic and enticing realm and perhaps something of an 
enigma. For all the country is firmly anchored in the West 
and - thanks to the air travel - more accessible than ever, it 
remains surprisingly little known, visited or understood by 
outsiders from Europe or North America. Growing up in the 
United Kingdom and increasingly fascinated by the world 
beyond, I was assailed by images of the Middle East, the US, 
South and East Asia. However, media and cultural coverage 
of Latin America - and Brazil - was much thinner. To the 
extent that Brazil featured in general UK cultural awareness, 
it was through the optics of football, Carnaval, wildlife 
documentaries and the exploits of exiled South Londoner, Rio 
resident and sometime train robber, Ronnie Biggs. The paucity 
of international coverage afforded to Brazil remains a mystery. 
However, for myself and other Brazilianists, the very lack of 
attention has served as a pole of attraction. I suppose we must 
be hard wired contrarians!
Yet, for all its unjustified obscurity, Brazil matters and, it is fair 
to say, its global profile has at last begun to rise. Some simple 
facts underscore why this is the case. Firstly and most basically, 
Brazil is by far the largest country by land area and population 
in Latin America. Geographically and ecologically it is in a 
class of its own, playing host to the planet’s most biodiverse 
habitats, largest river systems and richest supplies of key 
raw materials including soya, iron ore and, of course, coffee. 
Brazil’s population, at just over 200 million is characterized by 
astonishing ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Brazil has become a leading center of cultural 
production whether in the fields of music, sport, cinema, 
literature or art. Following rapid urbanization in the 20th 
Century, Brazil plays host to two megacities, Rio de Janeiro and 
São Paulo as well as several urban centers whose populations 
exceed 2 million. Such urbanization sits side by side with vast 
tracts of land - millions of hectares - which, despite economic 
progress, have yet to see any significant habitation.
Arguably, the sense that Brazil really matters centers most on 
its economy. Despite a sharp recession from which it is only 
just emerging, Brazil’s economic performance over the past 
quarter century represents a remarkable turnaround. During 
the 1970s and the crisis-ridden 1980s, Brazil endured repeated 
bouts of hyper-inflation. During the latter period - also 
known as the lost decade - inflation accelerated to three and 
four digits on an annual basis while growth stagnated.1 These 
unwelcome developments accompanied the unfolding of the 
debt-adjustment crisis. This crisis was not unique to Brazil 
and indeed had been triggered by the Mexican debt default in 
1983. In the Brazilian context the debt crisis brought with it 
a combination of high inflation, declining output and fiscal 
adjustment. This in turn triggered a rising tide of poverty and 
inequality. Brazil’s transition from military to civilian rule 
in 1985 could not have occurred in less propitious economic 
circumstances. 
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Yet, despite this unpromising start and further failed 
stabilization efforts, by the mid 1990s policy makers had 
succeeded in taming inflation. In doing so they helped to 
sow the seeds of a more inclusive and sustainable growth 
strategy. The new macroeconomic framework - the Real Plan 
- involved the introduction of a new currency, the abolition 
of indexation and a measure of fiscal adjustment. In parallel 
with an increasingly open economy the Real Plan set Brazil on 
a new course as poverty and inequality began to decline. In the 
first decade of the new millennium the initial achievements of 
the Real Plan were built on by the administration of President 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva - universally known as Lula. Among 
other celebrated initiatives President da Silva introduced the 
Bolsa Familía, a conditional cash transfer program.2 This, 
together with booming commodities markets and expanding 
employment, ensured that Brazil’s bull run of growth during 
the 2003-2012 period was genuinely pro-poor. 
By the end of the last decade, Brazil’s successful track record 
on inclusive growth had placed Brazil firmly on the map as an 
emerging market economy to watch. Thus it was that Brazil 
became the ”B” of the BRIC economies, a grouping identified 
by then Goldman Sachs Chief Economist, Jim O’Neill. The 
Lula administration was not slow in capitalizing on Brazil’s 
new found strength and sought to leverage it on the global 
stage. Through soft power projection initiatives such as 
development assistance in Africa and forays into international 
peacekeeping, Brazil at last appeared poised to play the global 
role so long warranted by its geographical extent, population 
size and economic heft. As Brazil stood on the brink of global 
stardom, The Economist on a front cover in 2009 famously 
depicted the Christ the Redeemer statue lifting off like a 
rocket.3
As we all know now, Brazil’s moment in the sun was to prove 
short-lived. From 2012 onwards a series of interlocking crises 
began to afflict the country, the roots of which I will explore 
in more detail later. On the economic plane, a slump in 
international commodities prices severely impacted output 
and demand, contributing to a sharp and prolonged recession. 
Brazil’s post 1985 democratic settlement also appeared 
imperiled as a series of corruption scandals emerged. These - 
termed the Lava Jato or Car Wash scandals - have focused on 
public works contract kickbacks, the proceeds being employed 
to illicitly finance political parties. Although not directly 
implicated in the Car Wash scandal, allegations surrounding 
the misrepresentation of public sector accounts were sufficient 
to ensure the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in 
August 2016. Her centre right replacement, President Michel 
Temer, has subsequently attempted to enact a series of free 
market reforms reminiscent of the early 1990s. While there 
are signs of recovery - and inward foreign direct investment is 
at record levels - considerable uncertainty surrounds the near 
term future, in particular the outcome of the October 2018 
Presidential election. It is far from clear, even this close in, what 
the range of candidates is likely to be. 
As ever, Brazil continues to confound, fascinate, frustrate 
and charm in equal measure. It can resemble a sequence of 
piquant, unpredictable events racing past the observer like 
a sped up, oversaturated Technicolor film. Making sense 
of this reality is not for the faint hearted. As Tom Jobim 
said himself, “Brazil is not for beginners”. Nevertheless, and 
perhaps foolhardily I will attempt to set out what I conceive 
to be some regularities or constant features associated with 
Brazil’s long term development process. To begin doing this 
I would like to expand on Brazil’s long term progress and 
achievements. I do this for two reasons. First of all I believe in 
the current crisis it is all too easy to overlook the enormous 
strides forward made over the post World War 2 period. A 
corrective to commonplace current negative perceptions is 
long overdue. Second, to the extent that anyone sets out to 
recommend changes to Brazil’s development strategy, it is at 
least as important to reflect on what has worked as well as what 
has not.
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Progress and achievements
The Brazil that we experience today is very much the product 
of an era which could be loosely termed “developmentalist”. 
This era dates back to the Vargas years of the early 1930s, 
through World War II and into the 1960s and 1970s. Curiously, 
while the country adopted a more neo liberal course in 
the 1980s and 1990s, much of the policy and institutional 
architecture of developmentalism was never really dismantled. 
Indeed, under the Lula and Rousseff administrations (2003-
2016) it made something of a comeback.4 This was evidenced 
by the reinforcement of industrial policy and the sharpened 
focus on poverty alleviation. What, then, do we understand by 
developmentalism? What are its dimensions in concrete policy 
terms? 
To gain real insight, for once a dictionary-style definition is not 
a lame starting point. In Portuguese, the word for development 
- desenvolvimento - connotes a process of breaking away from 
the past, from inherited circumstances. It conjures up a sense 
of rupture and the erasing of structural impediments retarding 
progress. Starting in earnest in the 1930s successive Brazilian 
administrations - both military and civilian - conceived 
policies that aimed to set Brazil on a new course. A colonial 
style ‘model’ based on primary product exports was rejected. 
This was because such a model had resulted in geographical 
and economic disarticulation. Instead, policymakers would 
focus on measures that promoted greater national integration 
and economic self-reliance.5 This, it was assumed, would 
insulate Brazil from the kinds of global shocks exemplified 
by the Wall St. Crash. Such measures would also facilitate the 
modernization of economic, social and political structures. 
In a sense, the developmentalist ideology has long roots. It 
can arguably be traced back to positivist thought in the 19th 
Century. Such sentiment was especially influential among the 
military whose political fortunes would wax after the War of 
the Triple Alliance.
What then were the policy measures associated with 
developmentalism? What have been their lasting legacies and 
achievements? Without doubt, the crowning accomplishment 
of developmentalism in Brazil has been the structural 
transformation of the country whether socially, in terms of 
economic composition, spatial distribution of population 
or institutional characteristics. Prior to the onset of 
developmentalism in the inter-war years - despite limited 
industrialization associated with the coffee boom6 - Brazil’s 
economic structure remained little changed from the colonial 
era. It was focused predominantly on primary production 
with a significant export focus. Brazil, despite some urban 
development along the coastline, remained a predominantly 
rural society. An urban industrial working class and middle 
class did exist but had yet to achieve real heft or political 
salience. 
Yet over a period of less than half a century - between 1930 
and 1975 - Brazil was to experience unprecedented change 
in all these dimensions. During these years Brazil rapidly 
industrialized.7 This process, in turn, resulted in waves of 
rural-urban migration. Accompanying this Brazil saw rapid 
social change with the growth in the organized industrial 
working class and the emergence of a new technocratic elite, 
alongside a massively expanded urban middle class. As Brazil 
became an increasingly metropolitan society, so its culture 
evolved. In the 1950s and 1960s bold new cityscapes formed a 
backdrop for the urbane melancholy of Bossa Nova and helped 
forge the fresh visions of a new generation of artists and 
filmmakers. 
The centerpiece of all of this was the adoption of a new 
developmentalist policy, commonly termed import 
substitution industrialization or ISI for short. This policy 
involved the domestic production of previously imported 
industrial goods. It was facilitated through a combination of 
protectionist measures, close business-government relations, 
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the establishment of nationalized industries and directed or 
subsidized credit. Unlike in previous epochs the state assumed 
a central role in setting strategic priorities for the economy 
as well as for more general development objectives. So it was 
that the architecture of Brazilian state capitalism came to be 
defined. A particular emphasis was placed on infrastructure 
and the pursuit of national integration. This was a direct 
assault, in fact, on the spatial disarticulation engendered by 
colonial era modes of production. Hence this period saw the 
realization of iconic projects such as the Itaipú dam, the Trans 
Amazonian Highway and the Rio-Niteroi bridge.
Though it would prove unsustainable by the 1980s, in its 
prime, the developmentalist ISI strategy did deliver average 
levels of GDP growth well beyond those previously achieved 
. Significant improvements in living standards did result, at 
least for those able to find employment in the burgeoning 
formal and industrial sectors. Many, though, were left behind. 
This was especially so for those who had been displaced 
from the land and had failed to find stable employment in 
the expanding urban centres. Still, the accomplishments and 
eventual legacy of ISI comprised many genuine advances. I 
shall briefly reflect on just a few.
The first lasting positive achievement of the developmentalist 
epoch centered on the forging of a capable state bureaucracy. 
As in other newly industrializing countries (NICs) such 
as South Korea8, Brazil succeeded in refocusing and 
expanding the policy architecture of the state. This enabled 
it to accomplish complex and challenging tasks such as 
masterminding the foundation of basic industries such as 
steel, overseeing the rapid expansion of hydropower projects 
and the formation of a social insurance system for those in 
formal employment. The creation of such organizational 
competences and capabilities would have lasting results in the 
years ahead as the Brazilian state, successfully, took on major 
logistical challenges. These have included orchestrating the 
world’s largest privatization program, successfully bidding 
for - and running - FIFA 2014 and the Rio 2016 Olympics and, 
most notably, setting up the administratively complex Bolsa 
Familía Conditional Cash Transfer program. Perhaps less well 
recognized are the considerable achievements the Brazilian 
state has recorded in the public health domain. The successful 
battle against HIV-Aids through the then controversial 
distribution of generic medicines is a case in point. Anyone 
who still imagines that the Brazilian state lacks administrative 
finesse need only witness the slick operation which is the 
nation’s electronic voting system. Not a missing ballot paper or 
hanging chad is in sight!
An especially notable - and lasting - achievement connected 
with the Brazilian developmentalist industrialization has 
been the creation of indigenous technological capabilities. 
My Brazilian colleague, Paulo Figueiredo and I identified 
deep learning effects engendered by the ISI regime and the 
technology policy architecture which emerged as part of it. 
In the more open market context that followed the crisis-hit 
1980s these capabilities provided a springboard upon which 
Brazilian technologies proved their commercial success around 
the world. Thus, for example, Embraer - founded as a state-
owned enterprise in the 1960s and privatized in 1993- achieved 
success by applying its technological and manufacturing 
capabilities to the fast-expanding regional jetliner market.9 For 
this reason, Brazil has become the largest manufacturer of civil 
jet transport aircraft outside Europe and North America. I do 
not doubt that many have you have flown on KLM’s Embraer 
fleet out of Amsterdam. The astonishing success of Brazil’s 
agricultural exports over the past two decades can also partly 
trace its roots to public investment in technological capability 
building, not least by one agency, EMBRAPA.
Another lasting legacy of the developmentalist era has less to 
do with shifting the basis of comparative advantage than with 
the creation of important state and civil society institutions. 
During the Vargas era and beyond - even during the period 
of military rule - the trade union movement developed 
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steadily. In so doing it helped to provide the rapidly expanding 
urban industrializing spaces with social form and organized 
representation. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was the trade union 
movement that provided the basis for the emergence of the 
PT, or Workers’ Party, a new force in Brazilian politics. Other 
political parties gained form during this period of military 
rule. The centrist moderate opposition groupings that 
emerged at this time formed the precursors of the modern day 
mainstream PMDB and PSDB parties.
In many ways it is possible to trace the more ambitious 
global role envisaged by recent administrations to an earlier 
developmentalist era. The military in the 1960s and 1970s 
advocated a Grande Brasil (Great Brazil) policy. According 
to this, the nation’s global profile would be raised through 
a combination of regional engagement and increasing 
cooperation with other countries in the Global South. In this 
sense more recent initiatives such as Lula’s pivot to Africa10 or, 
indeed, the formation of Mercosul, have distinct antecedents.
So far, the emphasis has been upon some of the more 
constructive legacies of developmentalism. I would not 
want to suggest, however, that some of Brazil’s more recent 
experiments with Washington Consensus-aligned policies 
have been without positive long term repercussions. The 
advent of a more neo-liberal policy orientation, the rise of the 
Washington consensus was the product of the unwinding of 
the debt adjustment crisis of the 1980s. From the late 1980s 
into the 1990s, the administrations of Sarney, Collor de Melo, 
Franco and Cardoso partially dismantled the structures of 
protectionism and state ownership which had formed the 
bulwarks of developmentalist ISI. This was achieved through a 
combination of trade liberalization, privatization and market 
de-regulation.
The promised gains in terms of productivity and efficiency 
resulting from these policies were only partially fulfilled; in 
fact average GDP growth through the 1990s and during the 
first half of the 2000s was below that achieved during the first 
three decades after World War II, a period in which ISI held 
sway. Nonetheless, greater economic openness combined with 
effective macroeconomic policy - the Real Plan - provided the 
basis upon which hyperinflation was vanquished.11 The effects 
of this were undoubtedly pro poor: the incidence of poverty 
declined sharply over the 1990s, well before the Bolsa Familía 
cash transfer program was put in place. The opening up of 
Brazil’s economy and a related surge in foreign investment 
did much to boost consumer choice, quality of service and 
technological upgrading. This was especially true in relation 
to telecommunications which, under state ownership, had 
become associated with long waiting times for telephone 
installation and poor technical quality. 
As noted previously, despite the apparent rolling back 
of the state, the policy architecture and instruments 
of developmentalism never really went away. The state 
development bank (the BNDES), technology and industrial 
policy agencies such as FINEP and Embrapa, remained in 
place during the 1990s and early 2000s, the high water mark of 
the Washington Consensus period. Nor were all State Owned 
Enterprises privatized: for example, significant chunks of the 
electricity generation sector stayed in public hands. Petrobrás, 
the state owned oil company remained under majority 
public ownership despite a program of share sales. All of this 
meant that when the PT administrations of Presidents Lula 
and Rousseff took a more interventionist tack, much of the 
developmentalist institutional machinery was in working 
order. This explains why these governments were able to 
launch and operationalize ambitious programs such as the 
Bolsa so quickly. Less successful initiatives - especially those 
centering on a new industrial policy for the oil sector - were 
also swiftly implemented.
Summing up, it is important to recognize Brazil’s genuine 
achievements and how these were shaped by aspects of 
developmentalist project and its neo liberal counterpart. 
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However deep the current crisis, it is essential to dispense with 
the notion that the past represents a terrible legacy or trap that 
has to be escaped from in all its aspects. In other words, one 
should treat the prospect of a clean break from the past with 
caution.
Still, especially given the magnitude of the current crisis, it is 
clearly obtuse to pretend that Brazil’s development process 
has not involved significant disappointments, failures and 
frustrations. It is to these that I turn next.
Discontents and frustrations
From an economic perspective, the most obvious and 
persistent difficulty that Brazil has faced relates to growth 
volatility and the related proneness to periodic crisis and 
recession. It was earlier noted that Brazil enjoyed favorable 
average growth performance during the ISI period. However, 
this average concealed phases of rapid output acceleration - for 
example during the so-called miracle years of 1967-73 - with 
periods of marked retrenchment and recession. The 1980s 
marked a transitional phase between developmentalism and 
the more open Washington consensus period which was to 
follow. However, this was associated with a steep contraction 
in output, worsening poverty and income distribution.12 
The embarkation upon a more neo liberal path in the 1990s, 
though it did produce price stability, could not inoculate 
Brazil from crisis and GDP retrenchment: witness, for example 
the crisis of 1998-99. This required IMF intervention and 
the adoption of a broader exchange rate target band for 
the Real. As if Brazil’s bias towards volatility needed greater 
demonstration we need only witness the events of the past 7-8 
years. These have comprised a euphoric expansion in output in 
2009-12 followed by a catastrophic recession, the worst Brazil 
has experienced since the days of the Wall St. Crash.13 
The surprising thing, when reflecting on Brazil’s post War 
economic history is that no matter the character of the policy 
regime du jour - whether developmentalist, Washington 
consensus- aligned or, under the PT, neo-developmentalist 
- marked volatility has remained a constant. All economies, 
of course, are prone to cyclical fluctuations. However, in the 
case of Brazil, and certainly compared with its East Asian 
emerging market peers, volatility and crisis have been far more 
accentuated features. Not only this, but Brazil’s average growth, 
whether in terms of GDP, productivity or living standards has 
significantly lagged that of broadly comparable economies 
such as South Korea and China over the past 40 years.14
Viewed over the longer term, part of the problem appears 
to be the difficulty in reconciling accelerated growth with 
price stability and external balance. This has resulted in what 
Brazilians have sometimes referred to as the Vôo de Galinha - 
or “flight of the chicken” in which an essentially flightless bird 
experiences momentary take off followed by a swift descent 
to earth. However, over the past 20 years, the achievement 
of price stability has diminished the role of inflation in 
bringing to an end periods of expansion. Instead, recessions 
in the contemporary era appear more likely to be triggered 
by external shocks - as in the case of a commodities slump 
- and/or adverse investor reactions to unfavorable domestic 
circumstances. The factors underpinning such economic 
vulnerability will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section of this lecture.
The failure to embark on a path of sustained, East Asian style 
growth has had adverse consequences for the evolution of 
living standards, poverty and income distribution. Of course, 
as argued earlier, we need to recognize the genuine progress 
that has been made in terms of poverty alleviation and the 
pursuit of greater equity over the past quarter century. Yet it 
remains the case that Brazil is still a highly unequal society. Its 
Gini coefficient at 0.54 is one of the highest in the world and 
entrenched rural poverty and urban marginalization on an 
enormous scale remain troubling daily realities. The sharpness 
of interpersonal inequality should not obscure the spatial 
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dimensions of poverty and inequality. Despite decades of 
regional policy, the North and North East remain significantly 
poorer than the relatively more urban, industrialized South 
and South East. Of course, one does not need to compare 
geographically well dispersed regions to witness yawning 
inequality. As anyone who has travelled through urban Brazil 
will know, spatial differences can be at their most acute at close 
quarters: witness the sharp divide between Rio’s cosmopolitan 
Leblon and the nearby favela of Rocinha, for example. 
The persistence of social division allied to the collateral effects 
of the global drugs trade - and the war against it - have fueled 
famously high levels of crime. Lack of personal security on the 
streets represents a constant reality for millions of Brazilians. 
In Rio and São Paulo conflict between organized gangs and 
the authorities has taken on a military character both in 
terms of the tactics and weapons deployed. A sense of wanton 
lawlessness is not only confined to the ranks of marginalized 
urban dwellers: as we have seen a culture of institutionalized 
corruption has pervaded big business and major political 
parties. With this fracturing of civilized existence has come a 
sense of despair and polarization, the like of which I thought 
I would never witness in such an agreeable country. Yet the 
cause is far from lost. Remedies are apparent once we begin to 
reflect on recurrent themes in Brazil’s long term development 
process. It is to these that I turn next.
Recurrent themes in Brazil’s development process
Brazil’s development experience has been marked with 
triumphs, failures, periods of rapid progress and of 
retrenchment. Its erratic and uneven course stands in some 
contrast to the smoother trajectories accomplished by newly 
industrialized countries in emerging Asia. In one sense, 
Brazil’s volatile flight path can be associated with a lack of 
consistency in policy regimes over the decades. As in the case 
of other Latin American countries such as Argentina and 
Chile, Brazil has enjoyed the dubious privilege of acting as a 
laboratory for competing economic theories, even paradigms. 
Thus, for example, Brazil’s immediate post war embrace of 
developmentalist structuralism witnessed a battle of ideas 
between those who wished to pursue a more self-reliant, 
autarchic path and those who wished to make greater use of 
the opportunities presented by expanding global markets. So 
it was, in the late 1960s that Brazil abruptly changed course, 
jettisoning traditional import substitution in favor of a South 
Korea like export-led growth model known as Post ISI.15 This 
regime was effectively abandoned in 1974 with the adoption of 
the Second National Development Plan. This marked a return 
to intensified traditional ISI. Import compression was once 
more seen as a solution to the development challenge facing 
Brazil, this time in a post OPEC I world.
The eruption of the 1980s debt crisis and the lost decade 
ushered in yet another volte face - this time involving the 
adoption of Washington Consensus, free market type policies. 
The 1980s saw one failed macroeconomic stabilization plan 
follow another as competing diagnoses of hyperinflation 
vied for supremacy. Between 1990 and 1994, Brazil embraced 
an unprecedented program of trade liberalization, only for 
protectionist structures to re-emerge as part of the neo-
developmentalist wave of the Lula and Dilma years in the 
following two decades. Since the middle of 2016 the wind has 
veered violently once more with the administration of Michel 
Temer re-embarking on the trade and market liberalization 
drive commenced - but left incomplete - in the 1990s. Only the 
broad macroeconomic framework centered on the Real Plan 
has remained in place over the past two decades.16 It is perhaps 
significant that the control of inflation is one of the few areas 
where one can point to genuine sustained economic success. 
The Plan aside, abrupt changes in policy regime underpinned 
by ideological and epistemological conflict among economists 
and policymakers has provided a rocking, unsteady platform 
for long term investment. It is hardly surprising that it has 
been impossible to address fully all the structural impediments 
retarding economic progress.

Prof.dr. Edmund Amann
The failure to achieve reasonable intertemporal policy 
consistency can be seen as the product of a frustrated search 
for political consensus. This concerns the very nature of the 
national development project and the relative balance of state 
versus market, external versus internal demand within it. It 
can be argued that the successful East Asian emerging market 
economies have been able to achieve a reasonable measure of 
popular assent to such broad principles.17 Admittedly, though 
the political cultures and mechanisms found in these countries 
differ greatly from the Brazilian reality. The case of one party 
rule in China and South Korean-style corporatism come 
instantly to mind here. In Brazil, the search for consensus 
has to contend with a fragmented party structure, strong 
regionalism, lively - though often fractious - democratic debate 
and powerful sectoral interest groups.18
Perhaps the most fundamental consequence of the unevenness 
and volatility of Brazil’s economic policy regimes is the 
persistence of what structuralists would term dualism. 
Dualism, in a nutshell, refers to the idea that the process of 
development has only been partially accomplished whether in 
spatial, sectoral or even inter-personal terms.19 Thus, modern 
world leading sectors, such as aerospace can coexist in close 
proximity to undercapitalized and unskilled informal urban 
manufacturing enterprises whose workforces subsist on the 
margins of indigence. The urban landscapes spawned by 
dualism present a jarring contrast between the ultra-modern 
and the decrepit; they often make quite an impact on first time 
visitors to Brazil. 
The incomplete nature of the development transition finds 
its analogue in Brazil’s contemporary position within the 
global division of labor. The developmentalist experiment 
represented by import substitution did succeed in effecting 
real structural change in Brazil’s economy. New industrial 
and services sectors were of course established. However, 
all too often the enterprises and activities involved were not 
globally competitive; nor were they be able to become so once 
Brazil embarked on a path of trade reform and economic 
opening in the 1990s. One consequence of this was that 
Brazil has witnessed moderate deindustrialization following 
the implementation of the Real Plan.20 Allied to a surge in 
commodities prices, the result has been a reversion to earlier, 
natural resource-based product, patterns of specialization. 
While commodities demand surged all seemed well. However, 
the post 2012 decline in commodity prices has impacted Brazil 
especially sharply given its increasing trade specialization in 
this area. One could draw an interesting comparison with the 
case of Mexico. Thanks to a more diversified export portfolio, 
the Mexican economy has weathered the past five years rather 
more favorably than Brazil. Brazil’s failure to address excessive 
reliance on commodities exports represents a long term source 
of vulnerability. This renders its economy more liable to 
volatile swings.
Brazil’s often frustrated attempts to broaden its productive 
base have, since the Vargas era at least, rested on close 
articulation between big business and the state. They have also 
involved, where deemed necessary, the creation of state owned 
enterprises and elaborate institutional support mechanisms 
for industry.21 The latter have been realized in a number of 
forms, whether the through the Ministry of Industry, External 
Commerce and Services, the BNDES development bank or 
other agencies such as FINEP. Elements of this model would 
seem superficially familiar to anyone conversant with the post 
war Japanese or South Korean experiences with export-led 
industrialization. 
Without doubt, Brazil’s statist industrialization drive has 
registered many achievements - the creation of steel, oil and 
aerospace industries from scratch, for example. However, 
as would have been wryly predicted by public choice 
school critics of industrial policy, the business government 
relationship has become polluted by rent seeking, clientalism 
and graft. The Lava Jato scandal has cast a powerful light on 
the less than arm’s length relationship between the state and 
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several of Brazil’s largest enterprises including JBS, Odebrecht 
and Andrade Gutierrez. 
Were corruption merely oiling the wheels of a smoothly 
functioning machine it might be tempting to look the 
other way. However, when one reviews metrics such as 
productivity growth, export diversification, timely completion 
of infrastructure projects, a lack of business dynamism is 
apparent. This is perhaps best exemplified by the limited 
emergence of new enterprises to challenge old incumbents 
or define new business models. Where are the Brazilian 
Googles or Apples? One is forced to ask serious questions 
about whether state-driven Brazilian capitalism has the 
capacity to cope with, or adapt to, the challenges of the 21st 
century global marketplace. The balance of the evidence is 
not flattering. It suggests that, embedded in a comparatively 
protected market and with state support close at hand, large 
Brazilian businesses have been too reluctant to engage in 
processes such as technological upgrading, fixed and human 
capital investment and product development. To be fair, this 
shortcoming is perhaps understandable given the perpetual 
uncertainty surrounding industrial policy regimes and future 
market conditions.
Another recurrent issue in Brazil’s development experience 
comprises the intertwined themes of education, social mobility 
and inequality. Without doubt, economic stabilization 
and targeted anti-poverty programs have had very positive 
impacts whether on the absolute incidence of poverty or on 
the distribution of income. However, Brazil remains one of 
the world’s most unequal societies. In the wake of the recent 
recession, the numbers of those in poverty have risen. The 
persistence of poverty and inequality over time stems from 
complex structural issues. These will all require resolution 
if Brazil’s development process is finally to be crowned with 
success. Perhaps the most significant issue surrounds access to 
high quality education, regardless of social, ethnic or regional 
background. While the Bolsa Familía may have done much to 
improve participation rates in basic education, the fact remains 
that education attainment levels remain poor by international 
standards.22 As long as this remains the case then a key 
obstacle to poverty alleviation remains in place. Fortunately 
there exists what amounts to a consensus that investment in 
better quality education for all is an essential pre-requisite for 
achieving critical development objectives. These would include 
boosting productivity, reducing social exclusion, improving 
earnings potential and breaking the inter-generational cycle 
of poverty. The thorny issue, of course, is how to make 
meaningful progress especially given the more constrained 
fiscal environment that currently exists.
Education may be critical but it is not the only factor retarding 
social progress. Access to good quality health care remains 
heavily dependent on income and place of residence. Access 
to employment is also impacted by economic and social 
background. Brazilian labor markets may have evolved over 
recent years23 but they remain characterized by segmentation 
and exclusion based on social, gender, ethnic and other criteria. 
Another recurring feature of the Brazilian social landscape is 
the persistence of a strong spatial dimension to the phenomena 
of poverty and social underdevelopment. As noted previously, 
despite years of regional policy, the North and North East 
remain significantly disadvantaged compared to the affluent 
South and South East. Thus, a question for the future remains 
one so regularly posed in the past: how to ensure that growth 
and development are regionally inclusive?
Towards a brighter future
The current crisis notwithstanding, Brazil remains a country 
where it is hard to discard a sense of hope, even optimism. 
In part this sentiment derives from the country’s pervasive 
vibrancy, its quirkiness, and a preternatural beauty that refuses 
to fade away. Snapping out of this misty eyed reverie, there 
are other, more concrete reasons to believe that the future is 
to be played for rather than feared. As a result of successful 
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past policy interventions, genuine economic achievements 
have been realized. New competitive strengths and capabilities 
have been developed. At the same time, real progress has been 
made in tackling ingrained poverty and inequality. These 
accomplishments provide a good base on which to build and 
further the course of inclusive and sustainable development. In 
doing so, Brazil will be able to benefit from a global economy 
that is in better shape than it was at the start of the crisis.
Moreover, the current crisis has demonstrated astonishing 
institutional resilience in the face of an unprecedented 
challenge to the post 1985 democratic settlement. Prosecutors 
have been assiduously and fearlessly rooting out corruption 
at the highest levels of politics and business. The task of 
clearing out the Augean stables has been long and arduous. 
There has been a high economic price to pay. Despite this, 
the public at large have backed the prosecution effort. They 
have proved themselves “mad as hell” and no longer willing 
to accept the old, corrupt order. This may presage the shift in 
social and political consciousness necessary to underpin vital 
reforms. The axes of a potential reform agenda will inevitably 
be shaped by the recurring structural challenges identified 
earlier. As should be evident, their rectification will be no easy 
matter. It will require resources, time and, above all, political 
commitment. Yet, if Brazil is to realize its undoubted potential, 
there really is no other choice. 
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Notes
1 Baer 2014.
2 Barrientos et. al 2016.
3 The Economist, November 14th, 2009.
4 Ioris 2014.
5 Thorp 1998.
6 Mattoon 1977.
7 Baer 2014.
8 See Amsden 1989.
9 Amann & Figueiredo 2012.
10 See IPEA 2011.
11 Amann & Baer 2003.
12 Baer 2014.
13 Amann & Barrientos 2016.
14 For a compelling study of the productivity issue see Palma 
(2010).
15 Ioris 2014.
16 For detailed discussion of the institutional and political 
foundations of economic stabilisation see Alston et. al. 
2016.
17 For a detailed comparison of the political economy of 
Brazilian and South Korean industrialisation see Kohli 
2004.
18 Alston et al. 2016.
19 See Kay 1989.
20 Bonelli & Pinheiro 2016.
21 Musacchio & Lazzarini 2014.
22 Moura Castro (forthcoming).
23 See Ferreira et al. 2014.
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Brazil, Latin America’s largest and most populous country, ranks 
among the world’s premier emerging market countries. Over the past 
two decades the country’s international profile has risen steadily and 
it now forms part of the BRIC grouping of nations. Brazil can be seen 
as a key player in an increasingly multi polar world. Its rise to global 
prominence followed victory over hyperinflation and a partially 
successful attack on poverty and inequality. Yet Brazil’s enhanced 
international standing is now threatened by a deep economic recession 
and a political crisis that has already claimed one president. 
This lecture considers these events in longer term perspective. More 
specifically, it highlights the recurrent structural constraints which have 
afflicted Brazil’s development process over the decades. These centre 
on issues such as the dualistic and partial nature of modernization; 
overreliance on commodities exports; inconsistency in economic 
policy regimes, and clientalistic relationships between the state and big 
business. Can these issues be addressed? Can Brazil emerge from crisis 
and resume its upward trajectory? There are grounds for optimism on 
these scores. 
In first place ss a result of successful past policy interventions, genuine 
economic achievements have been realized. New competitive strengths 
and capabilities have been developed. At the same time, real progress 
has been made in tackling ingrained poverty and inequality. These 
accomplishments provide a good base on which to build and further 
the course of inclusive development. 
Moreover, the current crisis has demonstrated astonishing institutional 
resilience in the face of severe challenge to the post 1985 democratic 
settlement. Prosecutors have fearlessly taken on powerful vested 
interests. The public has proven no longer willing to accept pervasive 
corruption in government or in business. This may presage the shift in 
social and political consciousness necessary to underpin vital reforms. 
